

檔 號：

保存年限：

金融監督管理委員會保險局 函

地址：新北市板橋區縣民大道二段7號17樓

聯絡方式：吳韋村 02-8968-0899#0714

受文者：中華民國人壽保險商業同業公會（代表人黃調貴先生）

發文日期：中華民國107年10月31日

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密等及解密條件或保密期限：

附件：如說明(107S408818_1_311550037516.pdf、107S408818_2_311550037516.pdf、107S408818_3_311550037516.pdf、107S408818_4_311550037516.pdf)

主旨：有關法務部調查局函知更新「防制洗錢金融行動工作組織（FATF）」公布防制洗錢與打擊資恐有嚴重缺失之國家或地區、及其他未遵循或未充分遵循國際防制洗錢組織建議之國家或地區名單一案，請依洗錢防制法、資恐防制法等相關規定辦理，請查照。

說明：依據本會107年10月29日金管銀法字第10701190420號函（副本）轉法務部調查局107年10月23日調錢貳字第10735568880號函辦理（該局107年7月2日調錢貳字第10735544490號函檢發之名單停止適用）。檢附上函暨附件影本一份。

正本：台灣人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人黃思國先生)、國泰人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人黃調貴先生)、中國人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人王銘陽先生)、南山人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人杜英宗先生)、新光人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人吳東進先生)、富邦人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人蔡明興先生)、三商美邦人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人陳翔玠先生)、全球人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人彭騰德先生)、臺銀人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人劉玉枝女士)、中華郵政股份有限公司(代表人魏健宏先生)、第一金人壽保險股份有限公司、保德信國際人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人葛納森先生)、安聯人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人薛傳睿先生)、保誠人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人劉添先生)、國際康健人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人朱立明先生)、合作金庫人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人杜振遠先生)、元大人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人江朝國先生)、宏泰人壽保險股份有限公司(代表人魯奐毅先生)、遠雄人壽保險事業股份有限公司(代表人孟嘉仁先生)、英屬百慕達商友邦人壽保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人侯文成先生)、英屬百慕達商安達人壽保險股份有限公司台灣分公司、法商法國巴黎人壽保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人戴朝暉先生)、英屬曼島商蘇黎世國際人壽保險股份有限公司台灣分公司、臺灣產物保險股份有限公司(代表人李泰宏先生)、兆豐產物保險



股份有限公司(代表人梁正德先生)、富邦產物保險股份有限公司(代表人陳燦煌先生)、和泰產物保險股份有限公司(代表人鄭林經先生)、泰安產物保險股份有限公司(代表人李松季先生)、明台產物保險股份有限公司(代表人熊谷真樹先生)、南山產物保險股份有限公司(代表人陳棠先生)、第一產物保險股份有限公司(代表人李正漢先生)、旺旺友聯產物保險股份有限公司(代表人洪吉雄先生)、新光產物保險股份有限公司(代表人吳昕紘先生)、華南產物保險股份有限公司(代表人吳崇權先生)、國泰世紀產物保險股份有限公司(代表人蔡鎮球先生)、新安東京海上產物保險股份有限公司(代表人陳忠鏗先生)、台壽保產物保險股份有限公司(代表人林欽淼先生)、中央再保險股份有限公司(代表人楊誠對先生)、美商安達產物保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人曾增成先生)、香港商亞洲保險有限公司台灣分公司(代表人宋安樂先生)、法商法國巴黎產物保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人王瑜華女士)、法商科法斯產物保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人張育立先生)、德商科隆再保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人曾蕙芬女士)、英屬百慕達商美國再保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人蔡佩君女士)、新加坡商美國國際產物保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人林建忠先生)、比利時商裕利安宜產物保險股份有限公司台灣分公司(代表人郭駿家先生)

副本：中華民國產物保險商業同業公會(代表人陳燦煌先生)、中華民國人壽保險商業同業公會(代表人黃調貴先生)(以上含附件)、本局綜合監理組

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檔 號：

保存年限：

金融監督管理委員會 函

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發文日期：中華民國107年10月29日

發文字號：金管銀法字第10701190420號

速別：普通件

密等及解密條件或保密期限：

附件：如說明(107B104838_1_291442254832.pdf、107B104838_2_291442254832.pdf、107B104838_3_291442254832.pdf)

主旨：有關法務部調查局函知更新「防制洗錢金融行動工作組織(FATF)」公布防制洗錢與打擊資恐有嚴重缺失之國家或地區、及其他未遵循或未充分遵循國際防制洗錢組織建議之國家或地區名單一案，請查照轉知。

說明：依據法務部調查局107年10月23日調錢貳字第10735568880號函辦理（該局107年7月2日調錢貳字第10735544490號函檢發之名單停止適用）。檢附上函暨附件影本一份。

正本：中華民國銀行商業同業公會全國聯合會（代表人呂桔誠先生）、有限責任中華民國信用合作社聯合社（代表人麥勝剛先生）、中華民國信託業商業同業公會（代表人雷仲達先生）、中華民國票券金融商業同業公會（代表人楊豐彥先生）、台北市租賃商業同業公會（代表人陳鳳龍先生）

副本：法務部調查局(不含附件)、本會保險局(併請轉知所屬相關公會)、證券期貨局(併請轉知所屬相關公會)、檢查局(均含附件)

2018/10/29
15:53:05
章

授權單位主管決行並鈐印

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受文者：金融監督管理委員會

發文日期：中華民國107年10月23日

發文字號：調錢貳字第10735568880號

速別：普通件


密等及解密條件或保密期限：

附件：如主旨暨說明


主旨：更新「防制洗錢金融行動工作組織」(Financial Action Task Force，下稱「FATF」)公布防制洗錢與打擊資恐有嚴重缺失之國家或地區、及其他未遵循或未充分遵循國際防制洗錢組織建議之國家或地區名單，請察照。

說明：


- 一、本局107年7月2日調錢貳字第10735544490號函檢發之名單停止適用。
- 二、依據FATF於今(107)年10月19日公布之公開聲明(Public Statement-19 October 2018，如附件1)，FATF於今年10月第30屆第1次會員大會提列防制洗錢與打擊資恐嚴重缺失之名單，力促各國對列名國家採取相關作為，略以：
 - (一)北韓(Democratic People's Republic of Korea，DPRK)：FATF呼籲其成員及其他司法管轄體應對該國採取反制措施，以保護國際金融體系，避免來自該國的洗錢與資恐風險，並應建議其金融機構特別注意與該國包括公司、金融機構及其代理人間之業務關係與交易，除加強監管外，並採取有效的反制措施，依據聯合國安全理



事會相關決議實施目標性金融制裁，以保護其金融部門免於來自該國的洗錢、資恐及資助大規模毀滅性武器擴散性風險；FATF續促各司法管轄體，依據相關聯合國安理會決議要求，採取必要的措施，關閉北韓銀行在其管轄區域內分公司、子公司與辦事處，並結束與北韓銀行間的通匯關係。



(二) 伊朗 (Iran)：FATF於2016年6月對該國高階層政治承諾及尋求技術協助執行「行動計畫」(Action Plan)，以因應其防制洗錢與打擊資恐嚴重缺失的相關措施表示歡迎，鑒於伊朗展現政治承諾並採取相關行動，FATF於2018年10月決定繼續暫停對該國之反制措施，惟伊朗行動計畫仍有多數項目尚待落實，FATF對此表達失望，並期待伊朗儘速推動進展，FATF亦期待伊朗於2019年2月前施行並修正相關的法律以充分遵循FATF標準，否則將採取進一步的措施以應對伊朗相關的洗錢與資恐風險。在行動計畫完全執行前，伊朗仍將續列名FATF公開聲明嚴重缺失國家，FATF仍將持續關注該國資恐風險及對國際金融體系的威脅，並呼籲其成員及其他司法管轄體持續建議其金融機構對與該國自然人及法人間之業務關係與交易採取強化客戶審查，包括取得與交易理由相關的資訊，以遵循FATF第19項建議。



三、FATF於今年10月19日另公布加強全球遵循進展文件 (Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process-19 October 2018, 如附件2)，提列其他未遵循或未充分遵循國際防制洗錢組織建議之國家或地區，該等國家雖亦

存在防制洗錢與打擊資恐嚴重缺失，惟已提交書面政治承諾並與FATF合作發展行動計畫以應對相關缺失，列名者包括：巴哈馬（新增）、波札那（新增）、衣索比亞、迦納（新增）、巴基斯坦、塞爾維亞、斯里蘭卡、敘利亞、千里達及托巴哥、突尼西亞、葉門。

四、FATF前揭公開聲明請參閱：<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/public-statement-october-2018.html>；
加強全球遵循進展文件請參閱：<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-october-2018.html>

正本：法務部、司法院民事廳、金融監督管理委員會、中央銀行、內政部地政司、經濟部商業司、財政部賦稅署、行政院農業委員會農業金融局、中華郵政股份有限公司

副本：

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局長 呂文忠

Public Statement - October 2018

Paris, France, 19 October 2018 - The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard-setting body for anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). In order to protect the international financial system from money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks and to encourage greater compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identifies jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies and works with them to address those deficiencies that pose a risk to the international financial system.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply counter-measures to protect the international financial system from the ongoing and substantial money laundering and financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks.

Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)

The FATF remains concerned by the DPRK's failure to address the significant deficiencies in its anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime and the serious threats they pose to the integrity of the international financial system. The FATF urges the DPRK to immediately and meaningfully address its AML/CFT deficiencies. Further, the FATF has serious concerns with the threat posed by the DPRK's illicit activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and its financing.

The FATF reaffirms its 25 February 2011 call on its members and urges all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to give special attention to business relationships and transactions with the DPRK, including DPRK companies, financial institutions, and those acting on their behalf. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF further calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures, and targeted financial sanctions in accordance with applicable United Nations Security Council Resolutions, to protect their financial sectors from money laundering, financing of terrorism and WMD proliferation financing (ML/FT/PF) risks emanating from the DPRK. Jurisdictions should take necessary measures to close existing branches, subsidiaries and representative offices of DPRK banks within their territories and terminate correspondent relationships with DPRK banks, where required by relevant UNSC resolutions.

Jurisdiction subject to a FATF call on its members and other jurisdictions to apply enhanced due diligence measures proportionate to the risks arising from the jurisdiction.

Iran

In June 2016, the FATF welcomed Iran's high-level political commitment to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and its decision to seek technical assistance in the implementation of the Action Plan. Given that Iran provided that political commitment and the relevant steps it has taken, the FATF decided in June 2018 to continue the suspension of counter-measures.

In December 2017, Iran established a cash declaration regime. Since June 2018, Iran has enacted amendments to its Counter-Terrorist Financing Act and Parliament has passed amendments to its AML law and bills to ratify the Palermo and TF Conventions. The FATF notes the progress of the legislative efforts. As with any country, the FATF can only consider fully enacted legislation. Once the remaining legislation is fully in force, the FATF will review this alongside existing enacted legislation to determine whether the measures contained therein address Iran's Action Plan, in line with the FATF standards. Iran's action plan expired in January 2018. In October 2018, the FATF noted that the following items are still not completed and Iran should fully address its remaining items, including: (1) adequately criminalising terrorist financing, including by removing the exemption for designated groups "attempting to end foreign occupation, colonialism and racism"; (2) identifying and freezing terrorist assets in line with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions; (3) ensuring an adequate and enforceable customer due diligence regime; (4) ensuring the full independence of the Financial Intelligence Unit and requiring the submission of STRs for attempted transactions; (5) demonstrating how authorities are identifying and sanctioning unlicensed money/value transfer service providers; (6) ratifying and implementing the Palermo and TF Conventions and clarifying the capability to provide mutual legal assistance; (7) ensuring that financial institutions verify that wire transfers contain complete originator and beneficiary information; (8) establishing a broader range of penalties for violations of the ML offense; and (9) ensuring adequate legislation and procedures to provide for confiscation of property of corresponding value. The FATF decided at its meeting this week to continue the suspension of counter-measures. However, the FATF expresses its disappointment that the majority of the Action Plan remains outstanding and expects Iran to proceed swiftly in the reform path to ensure that it addresses all of the remaining items by completing and implementing the necessary AML/CFT reforms. By February 2019, the FATF expects Iran to have brought into force the necessary legislation in line with FATF standards, or the

FATF will take further steps to protect against the risks emanating from deficiencies in Iran's AML/CFT regime. The FATF also expects Iran to continue to progress with enabling regulations and other amendments. Iran will remain on the FATF Public Statement until the full Action Plan has been completed. Until Iran implements the measures required to address the deficiencies identified in the Action Plan, the FATF will remain concerned with the terrorist financing risk emanating from Iran and the threat this poses to the international financial system. The FATF, therefore, calls on its members and urges all jurisdictions to continue to advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence, including obtaining information on the reasons for intended transactions, to business relationships and transactions with natural and legal persons from Iran, consistent with FATF Recommendation 19.

Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: On-going Process - 19 October 2018

Paris, France, 19 October 2018 - As part of its ongoing review of compliance with the AML/CFT standards, the FATF identifies the following jurisdictions that have strategic AML/CFT deficiencies for which they have developed an action plan with the FATF. While the situations differ among each jurisdiction, each jurisdiction has provided a written high-level political commitment to address the identified deficiencies. The FATF welcomes these commitments.

A number of jurisdictions have not yet been reviewed by the FATF. The FATF continues to identify additional jurisdictions, on an ongoing basis, that pose a risk to the international financial system.

The FATF and the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs) will continue to work with the jurisdictions noted below and to report on the progress made in addressing the identified deficiencies. The FATF calls on these jurisdictions to complete the implementation of action plans expeditiously and within the proposed timeframes. The FATF will closely monitor the implementation of these action plans and encourages its members to consider the information presented below.

Jurisdictions with strategic deficiencies

[The Bahamas](#)

[Botswana](#)

[Ethiopia](#)

[Ghana](#)

[Pakistan](#)

[Serbia](#)

[Sri Lanka](#)

[Syria](#)

[Trinidad and Tobago](#)

[Tunisia](#)

[Yemen](#)

The Bahamas

In October 2018, The Bahamas made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. The Bahamas will work to implement its action plan to accomplish these objectives, including by: (1) developing and implementing a comprehensive electronic case management system for international cooperation; (2) demonstrating risk-based supervision of non-bank financial institutions; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) increasing the quality of the FIU's products to assist LEAs in the pursuance of ML/TF investigations, specifically complex ML/TF and stand-alone ML investigations; (5) demonstrating that authorities are investigating and prosecuting all types of money laundering, including complex ML cases, stand-alone money laundering, and cases involving proceeds of foreign offences; (6) demonstrating that confiscation proceedings are initiated and concluded for all types of ML cases; and (7) addressing gaps in the TF and PF TFS frameworks and demonstrating implementation.

Botswana

In October 2018, Botswana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Botswana will work to implement its action plan to accomplish these objectives, including by: (1) assessing the risks associated with legal persons, legal arrangements, and NPOs, and developing and implementing a risk-based comprehensive national AML/CFT strategy; (2) developing and implementing risk-based AML/CFT supervisory manuals; (3) improving its analysis and dissemination of financial intelligence by the FIU, and enhancing the use of financial intelligence among the relevant law enforcement agencies; (4) developing and implementing CFT strategy, and ensuring the TF investigation capacity of the law enforcement agencies; (5) ensuring the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing and proliferation financing, and (6) applying a risk-based approach to monitoring non-profit organisations.

Ethiopia

Since February 2017, when Ethiopia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and ESAAMLG to strengthen its effectiveness and address any related technical deficiencies, Ethiopia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by commencing risk-based supervision for DNFBPs and non-profit organisations (NPOs) and developing guidance for the identification, freezing and confiscation of assets. Ethiopia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic

deficiencies, including by establishing and implementing proliferation financing-related targeted financial sanctions.

Ghana

In October 2018, Ghana made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and GIABA to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies. Ghana will work to implement its action plan to accomplish these objectives, including by: (1) developing and implementing a comprehensive national AML/CFT Policy based on the risks identified in the NRA, including measures to mitigate ML/TF risks associated with the legal persons; (2) improving risk-based supervision, by enhancing the capacity of the regulators and the awareness of the private sector; (3) ensuring the timely access to adequate, accurate and current basic and beneficial ownership information; (4) ensuring the focused actions of the FIU in accordance with the risks identified by the NRA, and adequate resource allocation to the FIU; (5) ensuring adequate and effective investigation and prosecution of TF; and (6) applying a risk-based approach for monitoring non-profit organisations.

Pakistan

In June 2018, Pakistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen its AML/CFT regime and to address its strategic counter-terrorist financing-related deficiencies. Pakistan will work to implement its action plan to accomplish these objectives, including by: (1) demonstrating that TF risks are properly identified, assessed, and that supervision is applied on a risk-sensitive basis; (2) demonstrating that remedial actions and sanctions are applied in cases of AML/CFT violations, and that these actions have an effect on AML/CFT compliance by financial institutions; (3) demonstrating that competent authorities are cooperating and taking action to identify and take enforcement action against illegal money or value transfer services (MVTs); (4) demonstrating that authorities are identifying cash couriers and enforcing controls on illicit movement of currency and understanding the risk of cash couriers being used for TF; (5) improving inter-agency coordination including between provincial and federal authorities on combating TF risks; (6) demonstrating that law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are identifying and investigating the widest range of TF activity and that TF investigations and prosecutions target designated persons and entities, and persons and entities acting on behalf or at the direction of the designated persons or entities; (7) demonstrating that TF prosecutions result in effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions and enhancing the capacity and support for prosecutors and the judiciary; and (8) demonstrating effective implementation of targeted financial sanctions (supported by a

comprehensive legal obligation) against all 1267 and 1373 designated terrorists and those acting for or on their behalf, including preventing the raising and moving of funds, identifying and freezing assets (movable and immovable), and prohibiting access to funds and financial services; (9) demonstrating enforcement against TFS violations including administrative and criminal penalties and provincial and federal authorities cooperating on enforcement cases; (10) demonstrating that facilities and services owned or controlled by designated person are deprived of their resources and the usage of the resources.

Serbia

Since February 2018, when Serbia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MONEYVAL to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Serbia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by: updating and communicating the results of its NRA; and demonstrating the investigation and prosecution of third-party and stand-alone ML. Serbia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) demonstrating that obligated entities have adequate risk mitigation-related requirements; (2) subjecting lawyers to AML/CFT supervision in practice, integrating the results of institutional risk assessments into supervisory matrices, and demonstrating the timely and effective imposition of sanctions; (3) demonstrating that competent authorities have timely access to beneficial ownership information regarding legal persons, and that such information is adequate, accurate, and current; (4) demonstrating the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions measures related to terrorist financing and taking proportionate measures for non-profit organisations in line with a risk-based approach; and (5) demonstrating the implementation without delay of targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation financing.

Sri Lanka

Since November 2017, when Sri Lanka made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and APG to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Sri Lanka has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by providing case studies and statistics to demonstrate that competent authorities can obtain beneficial ownership information in relation to legal persons in a timely manner; issuing amendments to the directive in relation to CDD obligations; and establishing a targeted financial sanctions regime to implement relevant UNSCRs related to Iran and issuing a related directive. Sri Lanka should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by enhancing risk-based supervision high-risk DNFBPs, including through prompt and

dissuasive enforcement actions and sanctions, as appropriate; and demonstrating effective implementation of its targeted financial sanctions obligations related to proliferation financing.

Syria

Since February 2010, when Syria made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Syria has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Syria had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by criminalising terrorist financing and establishing procedures for freezing terrorist assets. While the FATF determined that Syria has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and will conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.

Trinidad and Tobago

Since November 2017, when Trinidad and Tobago made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and CFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Trinidad and Tobago has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by enacting amendments to its Anti-Terrorism Act and legislation on criminal justice reforms which will speed up consideration of ML cases in courts. Trinidad and Tobago should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) adopting and implementing the relevant measures to further enhance international cooperation; (2) addressing issues related to transparency and beneficial ownership; (3) completing the legislative efforts to enhance the processing of ML charges before the courts; (4) taking measures to enhance tracing and confiscation of criminal proceeds; (5) ensuring TFS are implemented without delay and implementing measures to monitor NPOs on the basis of risk; and (6) developing, adopting, and implementing the necessary framework to counter proliferation financing.

Tunisia

Since November 2017, when Tunisia made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to strengthen the effectiveness of its AML/CFT regime and address any related technical deficiencies, Tunisia has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by conducting outreach to the DNFBBs to raise their

awareness of the AML/CFT obligations, and hiring and training financial analysts of the FIU. Tunisia should continue to work on implementing its action plan to address its strategic deficiencies, including by: (1) fully integrating the DNFBPs into its AML/CFT regime; (2) maintaining comprehensive and updated commercial registries and strengthening the system of sanctions for violations of transparency obligations; (3) continuing to demonstrate increasing efficiency with regard to suspicious transaction report processing; (4) demonstrating that its terrorism-related TFS regime is fully functional and that it is appropriately monitoring the association sector; and (5) establishing and implementing proliferation finance-related targeted financial sanctions.

Yemen

Since February 2010, when Yemen made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and MENAFATF to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, Yemen has made progress to improve its AML/CFT regime. In June 2014, the FATF determined that Yemen had substantially addressed its action plan at a technical level, including by: (1) adequately criminalising money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establishing procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; (3) improving its customer due diligence and suspicious transaction reporting requirements; (4) issuing guidance; (5) developing the monitoring and supervisory capacity of the financial sector supervisory authorities and the financial intelligence unit; and (6) establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit. While the FATF determined that Yemen has completed its agreed action plan, due to the security situation, the FATF has been unable to conduct an on-site visit to confirm whether the process of implementing the required reforms and actions has begun and is being sustained. The FATF will continue to monitor the situation, and conduct an on-site visit at the earliest possible date.